Consumers evaluate the convenience of changing their products according to the price paid as well as the technology (quality) level. When the consumers wish to capitalize the products residual value, they should return them as early as possible. Accordingly, we develop a model of Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where consumers seek to gain as much as possible from their returns and the return rate is a function of both price and quality. We model a two-period Stackelberg game to capture the dynamic aspects of a CLSC, where the manufacturer is the channel leader. We investigate who, namely, manufacturer or retailer, should collect the products in the market. Thus, we identify the best CLSC structure to adopt when the return rate is both price-and quality-dependent. Our results demonstrate that it is always worthwhile for companies to collect products and adopt an active return approach for returns. We investigate the eect of retail competition in both forward and backward channels and show the impact of eliminating the double marginalization on market outcomes.
Introduction
A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is a supply chain that integrates forward and backward activities into a unique system and includes, beyond the classical forward activities, several other processes, such as product 2007). Similarly, the end-of-life vehicles directive (e.g., 2000/53/EC) enforces EU car manufacturers to recover the waste within a CLSC and produce new vehicles without hazardous substances. These types of directives also exist in other countries. For example, Japan has implemented a recycling fee program to encourage the public to buy, and manufacturers to design vehicles that are more easily recyclable and thus abide by the Japanese Automobile Recycling Law In reality, the CLSC structure can take several shapes and the collection process can be carried out by rms that are not necessarily manufacturers. Savaskan et al. (2004) explore three dierent collection options in which the recovery program is initiated either by a manufacturer, by a retailer, or by third-party logistics.
They have shown that when a retailer invests in promotions or Green Activity Programs (GAP) and also collects used products, the maximization of both environmental and economic performance is guaranteed.
In a similar framework, Savaskan and van Wassenhove (2006) of the cases, the collection should be done by a manufacturer. All these papers, however, share a common point: Firms spend eorts and resources to increasing the return rate as much as possible. This approach is called value-stream or active return approach. In fact, rms invest in GAP to perform both the return rate (e.g., Savaskan et al., 2003) and the reverse logistics activities.
In comparison to the value stream approach, rms can also undertake an alternative approach for returns, which is called passive return policy or waste stream approach. In this case, rms passively collect all pastsold products by waiting for consumers who voluntarily return products (Ostlin et al., 2012) . Under these circumstances, the recovery process is a cost center that receives low quality (Debo et al., 2003) . Research on waste stream policy considers the return rate either as an exogenous parameter or as a random variable.
For example, Dobos (2003) models the return rate as a constant fraction of the past-sold products, while
Minner and Kleber (2001) characterize a return rate as a constant percentage of sales. Atasu et al. (2008a) hypothesize a 100% return rate while also focusing more on the price and cost dierences between new and remanufactured goods. Geyer et al. (2007) highlight the needs to coordinate the return rate with cost savings to properly assess the benets of a remanufacturing system. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) model a twoperiod game wherein a remanufacturer optimally decides price and quantity, while the players never invest in increasing the return rate, which is assumed to be a xed parameter.
Our rst contribution here is to highlight how rms' strategies and prots change when rms move from a passive to an active return policy. Our intuition is that the return rate should be endogenous and companies should undertake specic actions/strategies to change it (Ostlin et al., 2012) . In particular, we assume that the return rate depends on both the price as well as the product quality (technology). It is well documented (De Giovanni, 2014 ) that return residual value decreases over time, thus consumers may want to return it as early as possible to increase their rewards. Similarly, the technology developments substantially inuence the consumers' willingness to return. In particular, when technological advancements are not impressive, consumers have a lower willingness to return a product and acquire a new technology. Therefore, we model a return rate as a function of both price and technology level. We then compare the results with a waste return case to analyze how the eect of an endogenous return rate modies rms' strategies and prots.
The second contribution of this paper is identifying the rm that should collect end-of-use products to enhance both environmental and economic performance. The main problem of coordination in CLSC consists of the identication of a proper incentive scheme that suits the collector (Ferguson and Toktay 2006) . Incentive alignment and contractual agreements have been extensively investigated to properly set out various policies (see De Giovanni (2015) and Sluis and De Giovani (2016) for a latest overview). We model a per-unit incentive scheme (Savaskan et al., 2004) , which is the most intuitive and eective approach that rms use to coordinate a CLSC (Kumar and Putnam, 2008) . In addition, we seek to verify whether the application of a per-return incentive mechanism is ecient in a CLSC where the return rate is price and quality dependent. De Giovanni (2015) has shown that a per-return incentive is not ecient in a CLSC when the return rate depends on the GAP eorts only.
The third contribution of this paper is understanding how rms strategies and prots change under a competitive framework. Most of the CLSC literature has unfortunately disregarded the eect of competition, which, in our belief, should be incorporated into any realistic CLSC model. The main contribution in this research stream is presented by Savaskan and van Wassenhove (2006) , who model several CLSC structures to show how competition inuences rms' strategies and prots. We follow this paper to address the same research questions, but with dierent assumptions regarding the return rate (which depends on pricing and quality rather than promotional eorts) and the market structure (where we model a two-period game rather than a single-period framework Following these early intuitions, we rst consider a benchmark CLSC model where the manufacturer optimally sets the quality investments and the retailer sets the retail price in two periods. Note that the retailer does not participate in enhancing the return rate, so she passively sells products to consumers who visit the store. Next, we contrast the results of the benchmark game with an incentive framework in which the manufacturer provides an economic incentive to the retailer to collect the end-of-use products. This incentive allows the retailer to actively participate in performing the return rate. The results of these two models are then compared with a waste-stream approach, in which both players do nothing to increase the return rate. Finally, the introduction of competition in the downstream provides intuitions on how rms should act when competitors are present.
-------------Insert Figure 1 here
To recapitulate, we explore the CLSC structures that are displayed in Figure 1 and address the following research questions:
• How do rms in a CLSC set their pricing and quality decisions when their return rates depend on both price and technology developments?
• How do rms' strategies and prots change when they move from a passive to an active return policy?
• Which rm should do the collection of end-of-use products to maximize the overall prots?
• How does competition inuence rms' strategies and prots?
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a two-period model of CLSC.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 propose the solutions for all the models examined, while Section 6 introduces competition in the retail sector. Section 7 briey concludes the paper and suggests future research directions. Table 1 displays all notations we use in the paper. We assume that a CLSC is composed of one manufacturer, rm M , and one retailer, rm R. Whatever actions these two players undertake, they should be evaluated in a non-static setting as consumers purchase products in a given period, e.g., t = 1, and they return them after some periods of consumption, e.g., t = 2. Thus the purchasing and the returning actions are taken in two dierent instants of time (De Giovanni and Zaccour, 2014) . This is the reason why CLSCs should be studied in dynamic settings (e.g., Kenne et al., 2012) . Accordingly, we model a two-period game in which the rms decide on their optimal strategies to maximize their prots. This formulation has been used in CLSC 
where µ > 0 is the operational eciency and informs on the marginal impact of each dollar invested in quality on M 's prot function. These investments in quality also generate some production costs. It is well known that the larger the investment in quality, the larger will be the production cost due to trials, larger controls, high quality of raw materials, and employee eorts. Consistent with Nair and Narashiman (2007), we assume a linear production cost function that is expressed as follows:
where c p > 0 is the marginal production cost per unit of quality. Throughout the paper, we assume that M does not directly set the optimal wholesale price. In fact, the wholesale price is a function of quality.
Specically, we assume that M 's wholesale price takes the following form:
where ω is a positive constant. Indeed, the marginal benet should satisfy ω − c p > 0. The expression in Eq.
(??) represents a cost for R, who pays p Mt to M and then sells the product to consumers. In particular, R optimally chooses the retail prices in both periods, p t , and gains a marginal benet that takes the following form:
R will choose its retail price to guarantee that its cost per unit of sale is covered: p t − ωA t > 0. Both rms' strategies, p t and A t , contribute to the sales, thus exerting a marketing role that can be summarized in the following demand function:
where α t > 0 is the market potential and describes the potential consumers who are interested in purchasing the product during a given period, β t is the consumers' sensitivity to price and describes how consumers react to any price increase, and θ t is the consumers' sensitivity to quality and shows how demand varies any time as M increases his quality eorts by a unit. We assume that the market potential, α, changes from a period to another because we seek to distinguish between new consumers who purchase in the second period and rst-period consumers who return the product. In contrast, we assume that consumers price responsiveness and quality perception are identical in both periods because the rms sell to the same consumer type.
Consequently, β t = β and θ t = θ. Both rms' strategies, p t and A t , have important operational implications, as they have a direct impact on the return rate of products. The return rate denes the fraction of consumers who purchase some products in t = 1 and return some of them in t = 2. We assume that both strategies have an impact on the return rate according to the following relation:
where γ > 0 is a scaling parameter. The interpretation of Eq. (??) is that consumers are highly oriented to purchase the product with the highest possible quality (e.g., a smartphone with the latest technology available), and when a new version with a better quality is launched in the market they wish to buy it. In this case, they know that the value of the return highly depends on the price. Thus, to get back as much as possible, they will have a greater incentive for returning the product, i.e., ∂r ∂p1 = γ A1 > 0. At the same time, they evaluate the product quality before returning it. When the quality, A 1 , is still high even after using the product for one period, the consumers can be reluctant to return it, i.e., ∂r
the return rate function can be viewed as simply a negative demand that is decreasing in quality and yet increasing in price.
Because the return rate, r, is a fraction, one should guarantee that r ∈ (0, 1) , while the number of return q 1 r generates some revenues for rms. In particular, we model two scenarios in which the collection process can be carried out either by M or by R. 
where δ > 0 is the discount factor assumed by all rms. Dierently, when R collects the end-of-use products, she is fully involved in the reverse logistics process, thus the rms' objective functions are:
Within the games described in scenarios M and R, we aim at investigating how rms' strategies and prots change when the collection process is managed by dierent players, given that the return rate depends on both price and quality decisions. We seek to identify the best suitable CLSC structure to adopt in such a framework. Finally, we also pinpoint the role of competition in CLSCs when more retailers compete for the product sales and collections. In this sense, we can check whether the ndings by Savaskan and van rather on price and quality; ii) the investigated framework consists of two periods.
3
Model M -The manufacturer collection case
In this section, we study a game (model-M) in which M collects the end-of-use products, invests in technology (quality) and retains all the operational and economic benets linked to a CLSC. We assume that M is the channel leader and moves rst, and thus it can maximize the sum of its discounted prots while managing both forward (i.e., selling new products to R) and backward activities (i.e., collecting all end-of-use products from the market). R is a follower and maximizes the sum of its discounted prots for two periods while focusing on forward activities (e.g., sales of new products to consumers). In the rst period, given that the demand is represented by Eq. (??) and the marginal production cost per quality is c p , M chooses his level of technology eorts A t (and hence the wholesale price) to maximize his prots. On the other hand, R optimally sets the retail price p t to maximize her prots. The consumers consume q t amount for a given technology and price. The timing of the subgame perfect Stackelberg game is as follows. In the rst stage of period 1, M chooses technology A 1 optimally. In the second stage of the rst period, R optimally chooses the retail price p 1 . This period ends here. In period 2 some customers return the used product at the rate r to M . Also in period 2, M chooses technology A 2 , and then R follows by choosing the retail price.
Proposition 1: Assuming an interior solution, the rms' subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in the M−scenario are given by: (13) in the rst period, and (16) in the second period.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To satisfy the positivity assumptions for these strategies, we need to assume a certain relationship between the model parameters. First, note that all model parameters are non-negative. Clearly, ∆ − φ − g > 0 so that the marginal benet of collection is higher than the marginal cost of collection. Further, ω − c p > 0 must hold because the wholesale price always exceeds the unit cost of production for M . To have a strictly positive retail price in period 2, we assume that θ ≥ 3ωβ, which is a suciency condition. To have a positive
. When this condition is satised p 1 and q 1 directly become positive. To have a positive A 2 , the condition 2µ > α 2 (ω − c p ) should also hold.
Note that when rms disregard future outcomes in their optimization problems, that is δ = 0, the return rate is still positive and equals to:
Moreover, when the second period market unfolds, rms will mimic their rst period decisions that will be dierent in terms of the market potential, α, only. Indeed, if α 1 = α 2 then p 1 = p 2 and A 1 = A 2 in the presence of zero discount factor.
In this model both prices (wholesale and retail) increase in quality, but the collection rate decreases in quality. Interestingly, the higher the marginal rate of benet to the manufacturer (∆ − φ − g), the lower the quality oered in period 1 (A 1 ). This result implies lower retail price (p 1 ) and lower consumption (q 1 ) as the quality (A 1 ) decreases. Moreover, the return rate (r) increases in M 's marginal benet. Also, if M spends more to create a better technology, then it charges a higher (wholesale) price, which in turn will imply a higher retail price. That is, ∂A t /∂µ > 0, ∂p t /∂µ > 0, ∂q t /∂µ > 0 in both periods.
Corollary 1: In the absence of backward activities (collection, recycling, and remanufacturing), the unique subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes arê
Comparing the results in Proposition 1 to those in Corollary 1, it is clear that the second stage decisions are identical, independently of any backward activity. This nding is due to the model assumptions, as we assume that M does not collect any of the products sold in period 2 and that the game ends there (e.g., see De
Giovanni and Zaccour, 2014). However, the decisions in the rst period are dierent. In particular, the quality oered under collection process is lower than the quality oered without collection in the rst period, i.e., Proof. See the Appendix.
Indeed, consumers pay lower price(s) by trading-in their used products. If they are trading up, they may even obtain a better quality product because A
When moving from an active return approach that depends on both price and quality as in Eq. (6) to a passive return approach, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 2: If the return function is exogenous, i.e., r = γ, then the interior, unique subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibrium price, sales, and quality strategies are:
in the rst period, and
in the second period;
It is also clear from Proposition 2 that the return rate impacts the rst period decisions only. In comparison to the no return case (Corollary 1), M oers a lower quality in the rst period. That is, A M 1 <Â 1 . Moreover, the (wholesale and retail) prices and the quantities sold will also be lower. Specically, p M 1 <p 1 and q M 1 <q 1 will hold. Consequently, whether the collection rate is exogenous or price and technology responsive, the returned product causes a reduction in quality and price. The intuition for this result is that rms already know that there will be some returns, and there is indeed a future market for a new product. Quality is costly, and hence M oers a lower quality (hence charges a low price) for the returned product, to sell a higher quality product in the second period at a higher price. We argue that when the game is extended to many periods the quality oered at time t will be higher than the quality oered at time t − 1 but lower than the quality oered at time t + 1.
Scenario R -The Retailer collection case
This section examines a specic chain structure in which R collects the end-of-use products from consumers and sends them to M for remanufacturing and recycling. This chain structure involves businesses for which the residual value of return is marginal (e.g., cartridges, cameras) and thus sending it directly to M is logistically feasible but becomes economically inconvenient. Thus, R does the collection and retains a reward νgA 1 , where ν is a per-return incentive that M allocates to R. In this game, M is still the channel leader and the game moves over the same stages earlier described in the M-scenario.
Proposition 3. Assuming an interior solution, the equilibrium strategies in the R-scenario are given by:
Note that because the return rate depends on the rst-period strategies only, the following holds: p
We require the following batch of conditions to hold in order to meet the positivity assumptions:
First, we require that θ(1 + v) − βω > 0 holds, as this is a necessary condition to obtain positive q R 1 . Also the condition ∆ − φ − (1 + ν)g > 0 should hold as the marginal rewards from collection must be larger than Corollary 3. In the absence of any backward activities, γ = 0, rms' strategies in the R-scenario coincide with those in the M-scenario.
The equilibrium outcomes in Corollary 1 still holds in the absence of backward activities (collection, recycling, remanufacturing), that is γ = 0. In fact, if no customers return their used products, there is no benet for either of the players. Mathematically, when we plug v = 0 and γ = 0 into the outcomes in Proposition 3, we obtain the result in Corollary 3. Intuitively, when removing the backward activities, the two scenarios coincide; thus, we strictly require that γ > 0 to pursue the objectives of the paper. • socially benecial, as the consumers pay lower prices for buying the products;
• environmentally sustainable, as the consumers discard less end-of-use products in the landll at the end of the product life cycle.
• economically convenient, as both rms gain greater economic rewards.
In sum, closing the loop aligns with rms' business to the triple bottom line, which aims at performing social, environmental and economic performances simultaneously (De Giovanni and Zaccour, 2014), and independently of who does the product collection. Consequently, regulators and legislators should stimulate companies to collect past-sold products by establishing ad-hoc social and/or economic incentives (Kumar and Putnam, 2008 ).
Proposition 5. In the R scenario, rms gain less under a passive return approach than they do under an active return approach.
Proof. Because rms impact the return rate through pricing and quality eorts (following the result in Proposition 2), it will always hold that p
Notice also that as the second period decisions are the same independently of having the return rate as an endogenous or an exogenous factor, both rms' strategies and and prot functions are not inuenced by the return rate.
When R collects, we still obtain the result seen in Proposition 2. That is to say, if we assume an exogenous return rate, we nd that M will perform lower quality, prices, and sales in the rst period compared to the no return case (Corollary 1
5
Numerical comparison and sensitivity analysis
In the previous sections, we analytically characterized the equilibrium strategies in the M-and R-scenarios.
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium strategies in the second period are equal across the scenarios given the model structure. Accordingly, any dierence in the players' strategies and prots between the two scenarios basically depend on the rst period decisions. Because strategies and prots are algebraically involved, we will proceed with a numerical analysis. This comparison will provide new managerial insights and contributions to the literature. Indeed, one can always relax certain assumptions, e.g., an exogenous return rate to obtain a less complex model and more analytical results. Given that there are 13 parameters in the model, we have organized a sensitivity analysis in Table 2 to cover all possible cases while representing the ndings in a meaningful way. In the main row of Table 2 , we present the dierence between the rms' strategies and prots. In the main column, we numerically compute the derivatives of each model parameter with respect to one element in the main column. where:
Indeed, we have disregarded the sensitivity analysis for the second-period parameters as they have no inuence on the rst period strategies. paper, we nd that the player who performs the return process has no incentive to move to another type of CLSC structure. Indeed, this result is directly derived from the structure of our model when compared with the ones found in the literature. Our main novelty is the endogenized return rate that depends on both the price and the technology developments rather than on green activities programs or promotional eorts Claim 2. The trade-o between pricing and quality is more pronounced in the R-scenario.
Notice that the R-scenario wins the trade-o between pricing and quality investments. In particular, M invests more in quality eorts and R charges a higher price under an R-scenario. R charges a higher price to enlarge the return rate (see Eq. (??)) and thus increasing her prots by exploiting the backward economic rewards. In contrast, M knows that R will try to increase the return rate as much as possible by setting a proper pricing strategy. A large return rate can hurt M 's prots substantially, so he will try to reduce the return rate by increasing the quality investments in the rst period. This result is due to the negative impact of quality on the return rate, which will in turn lead to a larger demand. Finally, higher price and quality imply a more pronounced competition between the rms when R is the collector.
Claim 3. The larger the double marginalization eect is, the larger the rm's willingness to outsource the return process.
When the double marginalization eect is substantially high due to a large ω, each player has an incentive not to perform the return process. On the one hand, M prefers to outsource the return process to R because this action will lead to a lower pricing, larger demand, and it requires less investments in quality. On the other hand, R wishes M to perform the return process, as this results in a lower quality eorts and, thus, a lower double marginalization. To conclude, the double marginalization eect represents a serious concern in a CLSC as it directly inuences the return rate, and hence the CLSC environmental performance. 6 Competition in the Retail Sector
This section analyzes the case where there is more than one retailer in the downstream market in which the nal good is sold. Essentially, we add competition to the retail sector in the CLSC model introduced in Section 2. We expect competition to reduce both the retail and the wholesale prices. We uncover the extent to which the downstream competition impacts the M 's decision making process. We solve the CLSC model backwards to characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium. Assume that there are n retailers, and denote i for a retailer, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Retailers simultaneously and independently choose their strategies.
Collection is carried out by the manufacturer under retail competition
Similar to Section 3, where M has handled the collection process facing only a single retailer, we now extend this analysis to include n retailers. In this model, we assume that while M collects all past-sold products and retains all economic advantages from closing the loop, n identical retailers are present in the market and compete in the forward ow business. Therefore, we assume that none of the n retailers interferes with the product collection. Accordingly, we characterize the game in four stages of two periods and obtain the following result.
Proposition 6: Assume that M collects the used products and n retailers compete in the downstream market. Then, the unique Stackelberg subgame perfect equilibrium market outcomes are the following:
In period 2, each retailer sells q CM i2
, the total sales is q
, and the market price is p
In period 1, the total sales is q
, the market price is p
, where the quality is A
.
See the Appendix.
We use the superscript CM to refer to the competitive retail sector (C) and collection handled by the manufacturer (M). First, observe that when we plug n = 1 into the above proposition outcomes, we obtain the same results as we did in Proposition 1 with a single retailer. Each retailer will sell the same amount because all retailers are symmetric in costs (facing the same manufacturer without any price discrimination) and serve the same consumers.
As the following proposition shows, the consumers are better o under competition. Namely, they pay lower prices and consume more, but at the expense of lower quality. This result contrasts with all the previous research in supply chain management on quality and pricing (e.g., El Ouardighi and Kim, 2012).
In particular, when competition is present, competition on quality is more pronounced than competition on pricing. This nding is not at all conrmed in a CLSC framework, as we nd exactly the opposite. Our results have roots in the economic and marketing theory according to which price remains the main lever that consumers evaluate, independently of some other factors (e.g., technological progress).
Proposition 7: When M collects the used products, it oers lower quality products to the competitive n-retailer market, charges lower prices, and sells more products, in comparison to the monopolistic retail market. Each retailer charges a lower price to the customers under competition.
Proof: We directly compare the outcomes in Propositions 1 and 6. The quality oered in the second period under retail competition is A
> 0 because n is greater than one. Therefore, the dierence between wholesale prices is ω(A Corollary 5: When M collects and the retailers compete (i.e., n → ∞), the following outcomes hold:
1. The second period decisions are:
for the price,
for the sales, and
for the quality. 
The rst period decisions are
lim n→∞ p CM 1 = ωµ + ωα 1 [δγω(∆ − φ − g) − (ω − c p )] 2(θ − ωβ)[δγω(∆ − φ − g) + (ω − c p )] , lim n→∞ q CM 1 = µ + α 1 [δγω(∆ − φ − g) − (ω − c p )] 2[δγω(∆ − φ − g) + (ω − c p )] , lim n→∞ A CM 1 = µ + α 1 [δγω(∆ − φ − g) − (ω − c p )] 2(θ − ωβ)[δγω(∆ − φ − g) + (ω − c p )]
Collection is carried out by the retailers under retail competition
We now characterize a model in which there are n identical retailers competing not only in terms of forward ows but also in terms of returns. Since the retailers are symmetric in costs (facing the same manufacturer who does not price discriminate) and facing the same customers type, it makes sense to assume that each retailer collects the same amount of returned products. That is, each one collects r(.)q 1 (.)/n units of product.
Noting that payment made by the manufacturer to each retailer is νgA 1 , then the collection is worthwhile if In period 2 each retailer sells q 2, 3 , ..., n.,
In period 1,
and the market price is p
, where the quality is
, where∆ = δγ(∆ − φ − (1 + ν)g), and v = δγgν.
Above, we use superscript CR to refer to the competitive retail sector (C) in which collection is handled by the retailers (R). Observe that when we plug n = 1 into the above proposition, we obtain exactly the equilibrium results as in Proposition 3, with a single retailer case. Each retailer sells the same amount because the retailers are symmetric in their costs and serve the same consumer type.
The following proposition is in the vein of Proposition 7, where M handles the collection.
Proposition 9: When the retailers collect, each retailer charges lower prices to the customers under competition. M oers a lower quality to the n competitive retailers, charges lower prices, and sells more products, comparatively to the monopolistic retail market.
Proof: We directly compare the outcomes in Propositions 3 and 8. The quality oered in the second period is
> 0 because n is larger than one. Therefore, the manufacturer's wholesale prices compare ω(A Corollary 6: When n competitive retailers collect, the following outcomes hold:
for the quality.
2. The rst period decisions are:
The proof of Corollary 6 is immediately obtained by applying the limit laws of addition and multiplication together with the L'Hopital's rule.
Similar to Corollary 5, Corollary 6 does not show the welfare maximizing outcome, because the upstream is still controlled by a single manufacturer. Although M loses some prots by not collecting the used products, this is not a signicant issue. In fact, M not only enjoys being the supply chain leader but also benets from competition in the retail sector by eliminating the double marginalization problem.
The Impact of Collection Program under Perfect Competition
An analytical comparison of the market outcomes under dierent collectors seems to be a daunting task due to many parameters and the involved expressions for quality, price and sales in Propositions 6 and 8.
However, we can perform this analysis analytically in a perfectly competitive retail sector. The following proposition ranks these market outcomes.
Proposition 10: Assume perfect competition in the retail market. It then matters who handles the collection process for the market participants. Specically, consumers pay (weakly) lower prices if retailers collect the used products. However, they consume (weakly) lower quantities at (weakly) lower qualities under the retailers' collection program.
Proof: It suces to compare the market outcomes in Corollaries 5 and 6. First of all, observe that the market outcomes (price, sales, and quality) in period 2 are identical in both Corollaries. We rewrite the second period quality expressions:
, when the manufacturer collects under retail competition (CM). 
Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the consideration of price-and technology-dependent demand and return in a CLSC model. This structure is highly relevant nowadays because consumer utility is a function of price and technology, among other factors. Another feature we add into the model is retail competition.
Indeed, in any actual market no prot maximizing manufacturer chooses to sell its product through a single retailer. As it is well known, having an n retailers in the downstream market allows the manufacturer to avoid the double marginalization.
We obtained the following results independently of whoever (manufacturer or retailer) does the collection.
We nd that wholesale and retail prices increase in quality, but the collection (or used product return) rate decreases in quality. Interestingly, when the (marginal) value of the collection is higher to the manufacturer, it prefers to oer lower quality in the rst period. However, he always chooses better quality product in the second period. As the quality is lower in the rst period, prices are also lower at all supply chain levels.
Moreover, if the manufacturer spends more to supply high technology products, he then charges a higher wholesale price. This in turn implies a higher retail price and larger sales.
Further, the manufacturer oers higher quality when the collection process is absent to overcome the loss of rewards from returns. Also, the existence of a collection program signals the technology level. Finally, each supply chain member seeks to be the CLSC collector and has neither operational nor economic incentives to leave this position.
When we introduce competition into the retail market, we nd that both consumers and the manufacturer are better o. Namely, the manufacturer increases its prot, and consumers pay lower prices and consume more, but at the expense of a lower quality. In the limiting case, which is a perfectly competitive retail sector, the manufacturer becomes a sole monopoly by eliminating market power in the downstream industry. Hence, the best payos are obtained for both the manufacturer and the consumers under retail competition.
There are several ways to extend the current research. First, because of the model setting, the second period strategies do not impact the return rate, although we were able to quantify the dierences between the strategies over time. Letting the return rate be a function of both the rst and the second period decisions would in fact change deeply our results. Second, we assume that legislation does not play a formal role in the model. Introducing one more player (e.g., the government) that decides certain legislation constraints would broaden the research scope. However, the current setting of the model would allow government to tax the returned products. This tax could be applied to the payment the customer gets per return. In this case, the results reported in this paper will remain intact because each customer is paid a x fee per return and the return rate is just a function of market price and product quality. Nevertheless, the model could be expanded to allow the return rate to be aected by taxes applied to dierent layers of the product chain. Third, we assume there is no channel coordination or integration between the rms. Several types of coordination mechanisms and integration strategies could be further explored to measure their impact on market outcomes (Glock and Kim, 2015) . Fourth, of course, consumers would like to see some competition in the upstream market, so they could benet from further price reductions. This aspect can be an interesting future research direction, because consumers would ultimately demand variety in the upstream.
Clearly the retail price increases in market size and product quality. Also, observe that the retail price is an increasing function of the wholesale price ωA 2 .
Stage 3: The wholesaler M optimizes its second period prot to choose the level of technology/quality A 2 , taking R's reaction function into account. That is,
The rst order condition yields
As expected, the higher the marginal cost of producing quality (µ) is, the higher the level of quality A 2 is. Plugging this A 2 into q 2 and p 2 we obtain
Note that some consumers return the used products in the second period at the rate r(
Stage 2 : Moving to the rst period, the retailer optimally chooses its price p 1 to maximize its sum of discounted prots. Namely,
Substituting the values of A 2 and p 2 into the above expression and taking the derivative with respect to p 1 yields
. Then from demand function the output becomes q 1 (A 1 ) =
where the quality decision A 1 is determined in the rst stage.
Stage 1 : Since the rst period decision impacts its rst and second period prots, M chooses A 1 by solving its aggregate prots in the two periods. That is,
Substituting p 1 (A 1 ), r(A 1 ), and q 1 (A 1 ) into the above maximization problem, the total prot expression
The rst order condition for the prot maximization with respect to A 1 is
This yields the optimizing value for A 1 , which is
Plugging the above A 1 back into p 1 (A 1 ), q 1 (.), and r(.) we obtain equilibrium price and quantity in period 1, and return rate as functions of all model parameters.
Proof of Corollary 1:
When we plug γ = 0 into the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1, we obtain the result in the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2:
This result follows from Proposition 1 where we have shown that consumers pay weakly lower prices under collection process, that is p
Proof of Proposition 2:
The dierence between Proposition 1 and 3 is how Stage 1 is formulated. The derivations in all the other stages are identical.
Substituting p 1 (A 1 ), r, and q 1 (A 1 ) into the above maximization problem, the total prot expression
Plugging the above A M 1 back into p 1 (A 1 ) and q 1 (.), we obtain equilibrium price and quantity of consumption in period 1 as function of all the model parameters.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The structure of the proof is similar to the one in Proposition 1. This problem is solved backwards as the collection decision in the second period will impact the rst period decisions. The second period decisions will be intact because there is no future and the collection rate only impacts the rst period decisions of both R and M . 
Plugging this A 2 into q 2 and p 2 we obtain
Note that some of the consumers choose to return the used products in the second period at the rate
Stage 2 : Moving to the rst period, R optimally chooses its price p 1 to maximize its sum of discounted prots. Namely,
, where v = δγgν. Plugging this price into the demand function
, where the quality decision A 1 is determined in the rst stage.
Stage 1 : Since the rst period decision impacts its rst and second period prots, M chooses A 1 by solving its aggregate prots in two periods. That is,
Substituting p 1 (A 1 ), r(A 1 ), and q 1 (A 1 ) into the above maximization problem, the prot expressions
The rst order condition for the sum of the discounted prot maximization with respect to A 1 leads to
Plugging this quality level back into p 1 (A 1 ) , q 1 (A 1 ), and r(.) we obtain Stackelberg equilibrium price and quantity in period 1, and return rate as functions of all model parameters.
Proof of Corollary 4:
It suces to compare the quality levels in the rst period.
When R collects used products, the quality oered in the rst period, as proved in Proposition 3, is
When collection program was not oered, as shown in Corollary 1,
1 it is obvious that we are subtracting a positive term α 1 θγδ(∆−φ−(1+ν)g)
from the numerator and adding another positive term γδ(
to the denominator. That is, the numerator gets smaller and the denominator gets larger. Given this and that the coecient (1 + v) 2 enters in both numerator and denominator, we conclude that A Stage 4: The retailer i chooses its output q i2 that optimizes its second period prot, given that market is in equilibrium:
i q i2 = q 2 = α 2 + θA 2 − βp 2 . max qi2 π i2 = q i2 ((α 2 + θA 2 − i q i2 )/β − ωA 2 )
Assuming an interior solution, retailer i's output is q i2 = α 2 + A 2 (θ − βω) (n + 1) , i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. In equilibrium the outputs of the retailers are identical because they have the same marginal cost of production and face the same demand. Then the total output is q 2 = nα 2 + nA 2 (θ − βω) (n + 1) and the market price is p 2 = α 2 + A 2 (θ + nβω) (n + 1)β in period 2.
Note that when we plug n = 1 into the above equations we obtain the same output and price expressions as in Proposition 1 with a single retailer.
Stage 3: M optimizes its second period prot to choose the level of technology A 2 , taking the retailers' reaction functions into account: max A2 π M2 = q 2 (A 2 , p 2 )(ωA 2 − c p A 2 ) − µA 2 + r(.)q 1 (.)(∆ − g − φ)A 1 .
The rst order necessary condition yields A 2 = (n + 1)µ − nα 2 (ω − c p ) 2n(ω − c p )(θ − ωβ)
. Plugging A 2 into q 2 and p 2 in stage 4 we obtain q 2 = (n + 1)µ + nα 2 (ω − c p ) 2(n + 1)(ω − c p ) , and p 2 = (n + 1)µ(θ + nωβ) + nα 2 (ω − c p )(θ − (2 + n)ωβ) 2n(n + 1)β(ω − c p )(θ − ωβ)
Note that some of the consumers choose to return the used products in the second period at the rate r(A 1 , p 1 ) = γp 1 /A 1 to M .
Stage 2 : Moving to the rst period, every retailer chooses its output q i1 to maximize its sum of discounted prots. Namely, max qi1 π i1 + δπ i2 = q i1 ((α 1 + θA 1 − i q i1 )/β − ωA 1 ) + δq i2 ((α 2 + θA 2 − i q i2 )/β − ωA 2 )).
Taking the derivative with respect to q i1 yields q i1 = α 1 + A 1 (θ − βω) (n + 1) , i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n.
The total output is q 1 = nα 1 + nA 1 (θ − βω) (n + 1) and the market price is p 1 = α 1 + A 1 (θ + nβω) (n + 1)β .
Plugging the above A 1 back into p 1 (A 1 ), q 1 (.), and r(.) we obtain equilibrium price and quantity in period 1, and the collection rate as functions of the model parameters. Therefore, we obtain the results as in Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Assuming an interior solution, the retailer i's output is q i2 = α 2 + A 2 (θ − βω) (n + 1) , i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. In equilibrium the outputs of the retailers are identical because they have the same marginal cost of production and face the same demand. Then the total output is q 2 = nα 2 + nA 2 (θ − βω) (n + 1) and the market price is p 2 = α 2 + A 2 (θ + nβω) (n + 1)β in period 2.
Note that when we plug n = 1 ( and the value of A 2 below) into the above equations we will obtain the same output and price as in Proposition 4 for a single retailer.
Stage 3: M optimizes its second period prot to choose the level of technology A 2 , taking the retailers' reaction functions into account:
max A2 π M2 = q 2 (A 2 , p 2 )(ωA 2 − c p A 2 ) − µA 2 + r(.)q 1 (.)(∆ − g(1 + ν) − φ)A 1 .
. Plugging A 2 into q 2 and p 2 we obtain q 2 = (n + 1)µ + nα 2 (ω − c p ) 2(n + 1)(ω − c p ) , and p 2 = (n + 1)µ(θ + nωβ) + nα 2 (ω − c p )(θ − (2 + n)ωβ) 2n(n + 1)β(ω − c p )(θ − ωβ)
Stage 2 : Moving to the rst period, every retailer chooses its output q i1 to maximize its sum of discounted prots. Namely, max qi1 π i1 +δπ i2 = q i1 ((α 1 +θA 1 − i q i1 )/β −ωA 1 )+δ[q i2 ((α 2 +θA 2 − i q i2 )/β −ωA 2 )+r(.)q 1 (.)νgA 1 /n].
Taking the derivative with respect to q i1 yields q i1 = α 1 (n + v) + (θ(n + v) − nβω)A 1 n((n + 1) + 2v) , i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n.
where v = δγgν and the total output becomes q 1 (A 1 ) = α 1 (n + v) + (θ(n + v) − nβω)A 1 n + 1 + 2v and the market price gets p 1 = α 1 (1 + v) + A 1 (θ(1 + v) + nβω) (n + 1 + 2v)β in period 1, where the quality decision A 1 will be determined in the rst stage. Observe that if we plug n = 1, the price and the output decisions boil down to the ones obtained in Plugging A 1 back into p 1 (A 1 ), q 1 (.), and r(.) the subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibrium price and output, and the collection rate are obtained as functions of model parameters.
